Effect of Corporate Governance Index on Dividend Policy: An Investigation of Textile Industry of Pakistan by Safdar Husain Tahir et al.
Oeconomica Jadertina 2/2015. 
38 
Efekt indeksa korporativnog upravljanja  na politiku dividendi: 
Istraživanje pakistanske tekstilne industrije 
 
Effect of Corporate Governance Index on Dividend Policy: An 
Investigation of Textile Industry of Pakistan 
 
 
Dr. SAFDAR HUSAIN TAHIR 
Assistant Professor  
Banking & Finance  






Department of Banking & Finance,  
Government College University Faisalabad 
Pakistan 
   
SABA BABAR 
MS Scholar 
Department of Banking & Finance,  





Department of Banking & Finance,  







Abstract: This study empirically observes the impact of corporate governance index on dividend 
payout policy by using the data on thirty textile firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange. The data 
cover the five-year period from 2009 to 2013. The data were gathered from financial statements of all 
the sample firms. Multiple regression models were used to check the impact of corporate governance 
on dividend policy. No effect of corporate governance index on firm dividend policy was found, and 
the largest shareholders also had no impact on dividend payout policy. A significant positive 
relationship was found between payout policy and stock value. Gross profit margin and operating 
profit margin had significant positive impact on the firm’s dividend payout policy. There is a 
significant correlation between the firm’s performance and payout policy. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance Index, Dividend Policy, Textile Industry, Largest Shareholders, 
Multiple Regression Model 
 
Oeconomica Jadertina 2/2015. 
39 
1    Introduction  
 
The term Corporate refers to a larger entity that is split into units different from the owners. 
Corporation has the right to enter into contracts, take money from people who invest or lend money to 
people, and it can take legal action against companies or be sued by someone. It pays taxes and also 
owns some assets. Corporate Governance refers to the formation of policies and constant monitoring 
of their proper implementation by the members of the administration of an organization. It includes the 
tools necessary for the balance of power among the members and their primary duty of enhancing the 
prosperity and possibilities of the organization. Corporate Governance refers to the layout of policies 
and some regulations through which accountability and purity in the relationships with the company 
stakeholders are protected by the board of directors. Payout Policy refers to the policy used by the 
company to find out how much it will pay to the company shareholders. 
 
Corporate governance is an important component in advancing the profitability and growth of firms 
through achieving allocative efficiency, so that scarce funds are transferred to investment projects with 
higher returns. Generally speaking, efficiency can be achieved if the investment projects offer higher 
returns as compared to the cost of capital (Zulkafli et al., 2003). Corporate governance mechanism 
provides protection to shareholders and other stakeholders, particularly investors. Good governance 
practices help to increase the share prices that could get higher capital. They also allow for the 
international investors to lend money and purchase shares in domestic companies (Okpara, 2010).  
 
Schwert (1981) investigated the market reaction to corporate governance mechanism. The author 
argues that those firms which were greatly affected by such governance practices reacted more 
profoundly when compared to the firms exhibiting good governance practices. In addition, Larcker, 
Ormazabal and Taylor (2011) investigated the market reaction to corporate governance practices. They 
criticize the governance practices for being value-destroying as they found abnormal return, reductions 
in CEO pay, a number of large block holders, facilitations for institutional investors, and presence of a 
staggered board.  
 
Dividend payout policy is very important in the company’s valuation procedure, but the issue is still 
insufficiently explored in the countries experiencing a changeover. Dividend policy refers to the 
decision of dividing the net income of the company into dividends for shareholders and retained 
earnings. The concept of corporate governance is one of the issues that have attracted the attention of 
researches and organizations around the world. The development of agency theory and the associated 
agency problem caused by the difference of opinion between the management and shareholders has 
given rise to the need for a set of rules, regulations and standards that work to protect the interests of 
shareholders. 
 
Corporate governance therefore aims to encourage investment by maintaining the rights and interests 
of all involved parties and, as a result, receives the attention of a lot of international, regional, and 
local organizations. The firms more able to maintain stable dividend payments are those that are also 
able to finance their growth opportunities. Thus knowing whether differences in dividend policy 
across firms can be explained by differences in their corporate mechanisms will help to find out how 
the implementation of corporate governance can be efficient. 
 
As regards agency theory, Jensen (1986) indicates that, if good investment chances are missing, 
companies can then relieve issues between the outside and inside stakeholders, meaning that 
shareholders use this method to manage the discipline. Zwiebel (1996) and Easterbrook (1984) claim 
the same thing: that the managers’ power can be minimized through dividend payouts. Rozeff (1982) 
examines if agency problems can be minimized by a high level of dividend payouts, as well as if it 
would be helpful to increase the outside financing at an earlier stage. Faccio et al. (2001) provide proof 
that dividends can be used by shareholders as a tool to acquire funds from outside shareholders. They 
advise that payout policies can minimize the misuse of the funds of minority shareholders.  
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Using the U.S. data, Chae et al. (2009) show that the companies which have greater restraints on 
external financing move towards decreasing the payout ratio when they have a chance of improvement 
in the corporate governance. Almeida et al. (2011) suggest that companies having good corporate 
governance also have a high firm value and better payout policy than the companies with bad 
corporate governance. Research shows that the companies having good corporate governance very 
rarely face the cost of taking loan, and that the cost is very low. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) examine 
how the companies with the greatest level of organizational ownership as well as strong external board 
control gain higher ratings when they issue new bonds on the market. Bae et al. (2012) examine how 
the shareholders who control the business have a substantial advantage in changing the company's 
funds into their own funds. 
 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 
The focus here is on investigating the impact of corporate governance on dividend policy. How will 
corporate governance affect the dividend payout policy in textile firms? When a company makes 
dividend policy, how do leverage and CGI affect the decision on dividend policy? How can the largest 
shareholders have impact on the distribution of dividend among the shareholders, and how can we 
calculate dividends from leverage, profitability and firm size? The firm decides on its dividend payout 
ratio after covering all expenses and taxes. Domestic investors always prefer to work as directors 
rather than ordinary shareholders. They always give preference to opening a new company rather than 
investing their funds in the existing company. The salaries of the directors are larger than those of the 
other employees of the same qualifications and experience. Company insiders get many benefits, two 




1.2 Research Objective 
 
The purpose of this study is to ascertain the connection between corporate governance variables and 
dividend payout of textile mills in Pakistan. The objective of the research is to build a relationship 
among corporate governance, profitability, and leverage and payout policy in textile firms in Pakistan. 
 
 
1.3 Organization of the Study 
 
The remaining part of the study is divided as follows: section two contains a literature review, while 
section three focuses on the data and research methodology. Section four presents the results, and 
section five includes the conclusion of the study. 
 
2    Literature Review and Hypothesis 
 
Corporate governance is a “process whereby suppliers of capital (shareholders) attempt to ensure that 
managers of the firms in which they invest provide a sufficient return. It addresses the agency problem 
whereby the shareholders (principals) are the ultimate owners of the firm and want to ensure that 
managers (agents), who are separate from the shareholders, act in the shareholders’ best interests 
rather than the interests of managers” (Foerster and Huen, 2004). 
 
The decision on dividend payout is one of the most important financial decisions for every business 
organization. Corporate governance can affect the dividend payout decision. There is a controversy 
about the relationship between corporate governance and dividend payout. L.S. Hwang et al. (2013) 
said that corporate governance is a positive practice, though the stakeholders cannot achieve their 
rights in dependent firms because these rights become weaker. Corporate governance enhances payout 
policy ratio. The authors said that corporate governance has a positive impact on independent firms. In 
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those firms the rights of stakeholders become stronger and they get their rights easily. The OLS 
regression model was used, which showed that corporate governance had a statistically positive effect 
on payout ratio. H. Zhang (2008) examined the effect of corporate governance on dividend policy. He 
described how Chinese listed companies pay low dividend to shareholders. The author found that there 
was a negative relationship between board structure and dividend rate. 
 
J.F. Abreu and M.A. Gulam Hussen (2013) compared dividend payout before, during, and after the 
financial crisis. They found that the impact of size and profitability on dividend payout was positive 
before, during and after the crisis. F. Lefort and E. Walker March (2005) examined the relationship 
between corporate governance and market valuation. They found a constructive connection among 
corporate governance, dividend payout and firm performance. 
 
Foerster and Huen (2004) scrutinized the links between corporate governance measures and stock 
returns. They highlighted that high governance ranking firms outperform other portfolios. Moreover, 
the market reacts significantly to governance related information, which means that good governance 
does matter to Canadian investors. Similarly, González and Muñoz (2004) investigated price reaction 
to corporate governance announcements. They confirmed that investors react to these governance 
practices, but the manifestations of their reaction depend on the extension and nature of these types of 
announcements. Furthermore, Chavez and Silva (2006) studied the corporate governance mechanisms, 
market reaction and liquidity impact. They depicted how the market price reaction is significant 
positive when the firm is in its announcement committed to higher transparency and protection of 
minority shareholders. In addition, shares that have voting rights experience stronger price reaction 
and liquidity enhancement than non-voting shares. The authors suggested that corporate governance 
mechanism could be an effective strategy for the countries that have weak provisions for investor 
protection. 
 
M.A. Halim and A. Bino investigated the link between dividend policy and corporate governance, 
which is calculated based on the ownership structure. A significant negative correlation was found 
between the dividend payout ratio and the percentage of capital owned by block holders. K. Gugler 
and B. Burcin Yurtoglu (2002) analyzed the dividend change announcements in Germany during a 
specific time period. They found that dividends signal the harshness of the issue between the large, 
controlling, small owners and outside shareholders. The dividend change announcements give new 
information about the issue. They used information on the ownership and control structure of the firm 
to test the rent extraction hypothesis and separate it from cash flow. They found that there was a 
significant negative impact of wealth in the order of two percentage points for firms. Bushee, Carter 
and Gerakos (2008) investigated how governance-sensitive institutions are connected with the 
improvements in shareholders’ rights. They also confirmed that low-turnover institutions with 
preference for small cap and growth companies are prone to be more governance-sensitive. 
Furthermore, they suggested that common proxies for governance sensitivity do not measure 
governance preference clearly. Klapper and Love (2004) demonstrated the relationship between 
governance and asymmetric information and other imperfections that the firm usually faces. They 
found that corporate governance is highly related to high market valuation and operating performance. 
They highlighted that countries with weak legal systems are more prone to firm-level corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
 
Bill B. Francis et al. (2011) researched managers who strongly prefer cash retention or stock 
repurchase instead of the payment of dividends. Agency problems between corporate insiders and 
outside shareholders have an impact on dividend payout policy. Managers prefer not to pay dividends 
or to cut them down. Firms which pay high dividends have a high business level. Allen Michael 
(1979) studied an important though neglected issue in corporate finance, namely the relationship 
between firm valuation and dividend payout policy. Hypothesis 1: Corporate Governance has a 
significant impact on Payout Policy. 
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3    Data and Methodology 
 
This study uses the data from the period between 2009 and 2013, gathered from thirty textile firms 
listed at Karachi Stock Exchange of Pakistan. The data consist of annual financial reports published by 
the Pakistani firms. The dependent variable is dividend policy, while the independent variable is 
corporate governance. The study also employs seven controlling variables defined in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1 Variable Description 
 
Category Variable Name Description 
Dependent Dividend Payout (DPS) Cash Dividend / Sales 
Independent a. Corporate Governance Index (CGI) 
 
b. Largest Shareholders (LS) 
a. The sum of shareholder rights, board, 
disclosure, audit, and payout indices 
b. Percentage share ownership by 
largest shareholder 
Controlling a. Operating Profit Margin (OPM) 
b. Gross Profit Margin (GPM) 
c. Return on Assets (ROA) 
d. Return on Equity (ROE) 
e. Leverage (LEV) 
f. Stock Value (MBV) 
g. Size of Firm (LTA) 
a. Operating Profit / Net Sales 
b. Gross Profit / Net Sales 
c. Net Income / Total Assets 
d. Net Income / Shareholder Investment  
e. Total Debts / Total Assets 
f. Market Value of Common Stock / 
Book Value of Common Stock 
g. Logarithm of Total Assets  
 
 





DPSit=β0+β1CGIit+β2LSit+β3LEVi,t+β4ROAit+β5ROEit+β6OPMit+ β7GPMit+β8MBVit+β9Sizeit +εit … 
 
DPS is cash dividend divided by sales and CGI is corporate governance index, which is the sum of 
audit, disclosure, board, payout indices and shareholder rights. LS is largest shareholders, LEV is 
leverage, ROA is return on assets, ROE is return on equity, OPM is operating profit margin, GPM is 
gross profit margin, MBV is market value of common stock divided by book value of common stock, 
and Size is the logarithm of total assets. 
 
 
4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
In this section the study will explain descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation and regression results to 
analyze the effect of corporate governance on payout policy. 
 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics results of textile firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange of 
Pakistan. The mean value of corporate governance index (the sum of corporate governance variables) 
is 0.8606 with the maximum value of 1.00 and minimum value of 0.50 for all the sample firms. 
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The maximum CGI value shows the firms with best practice in corporate governance, and minimum 
value of CGI indicates the firms with worst practice of corporate governance. The mean value of DPS 
and LS is 0.3970 and 6.7349 respectively.  
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
DPS 0.00 4.00 0.3970 0.8365 
GPM -0.32 0.75 0.1222 0.1333 
OPM -0.06 0.78 0.1158 0.1399 
ROA -0.21 0.61 0.0695 0.1448 
ROE -0.22 3.00 0.4580 0.6118 
LS 0.17 4.279 6.7349 5.3481 
MBV 0.01 6.161 3.0682 1.1390 
CGI 0.50 1.00 0.8606 0.1382 
LTA 8.54 10.91 9.5551 0.5637 
LEV 0.10 7.03 0.7188 0.8328 
 
 
The maximum and minimum value of ROA is 0.61 and -0.21 respectively, with mean value being 
0.0695. The maximum value of ROA shows firms with good financial performance. The mean value 
of GPM is 0.1222 and OPM is 0.1158. The mean value of MBV is 3.0682, with the maximum value of 
6.1616 and minimum value of 0.010. The minimum and maximum value of LEV is 0.10 and 7.03, 
with mean value of 0.7188. The LS has the maximum value of standard deviation (5.3481). The mean 
value of ROE is 0.4580 with the minimum and maximum value of -0.22 and 3.00 respectively. 
 
 
4.2  Pearson Correlation  
 
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation among all the variables.  
 
 
Table 3: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
 















































































































Note: *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level and **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
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The highest correlation is between the MBV and DPS, which is significant at the 0.01 level of 
significance. ROE has significant association with ROA at the significance level of 0.01. The CGI has 
significant correlation with ROA and OPM at the 0.05 level. Firm size has significant negative 
correlation with DPS and MBV and positive correlation with CGI. 
 
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
 
In order to move on to further analysis, the study has considered the major assumptions which are very 
important in panel data analysis. Table 4 shows the regression outcomes of all the sample firms. 
 
Table 4 displays in regression model that the stock valuation (MBV) (Coef. = 0.779, t= 10.912) has 
positive relationship with dividend payout at the significance level of 0.01. The results are consistent 
with F. Lefort and E. Walker March (2005). 
 
Table 41 Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout (DPS) 





































       0.562     
       0.119 
       0.971 
       0.000*** 
       0.986 
       0.004*** 
       0.090* 
       0.038** 
       0.040** 
       0.249 
Note: *Significant at 0.10; **Significant at 0.05; ***Significant at 0.01 
 
 
There is a positive relationship between gross profit margin (Coef. = 0.190, t= 3.048) and dividend 
payout at the 0.01 level of significance. The interaction between operating profit margin (Coef. = 
0.126, t= 1.727) and dividend payout is found to be positive at the level of significance of 0.10. Return 
on equity (Coef. = 0.275, t= 2.106) has significant positive impact on dividend payout policy, and 
these results are consistent with J.F. Abreu and M.A. Gulam Hussen (2013). Return on assets (Coef. = 
-0.295, t= -2.131) has significant negative impact on dividend payout policy, where the results are 
inconsistent with J.F. Abreu and M.A. Gulam Hussen (2013). Size of the firm has no impact on 
dividend payout, which is not consistent with J.F. Abreu and M.A. Gulam Hussen. Moreover, 
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corporate governance index, largest shareholder and leverage have no effect on the payout policy of 
the firms. The coefficient of determination (R2) is 0.40 and F statistics is 30.35. 
 
 
5    Conclusion 
 
This study has empirically observed the impact of corporate governance index on dividend payout 
policy by using the data of thirty textile firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange. The data cover the 
five-year period from 2009 to 2013. The data were gathered from financial statements of all the 
sample firms. Regression analysis was used to check the impact of corporate governance on dividend 
policy. 
 
The present study has mainly focused on two issues of corporate governance: first, how the legal 
environment affects corporate governance instruments and the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm value; second, what the determinants of corporate governance practices are. No 
effect of corporate governance on firm dividend policy is found, and the largest shareholders also have 
no impact on dividend payout policy. A significant positive relationship is found between payout 
policy and stock value. Gross profit margin and operating profit margin have significant positive 
impact on the firm’s dividend payout policy. There is a significant correlation between the firm’s 
performance and payout policy. Firm size and leverage have no impact on the dividend policy of 
textile firms. Firms should focus on improving their corporate governance in order to increase the 
payout policy. Dividend payments reduce the amount of free cash flow available for use at the 
discretion of corporate insiders, so they help alleviate the exploitation of minority shareholders. 
 
 
5.1 Policy Implications 
 
Corporate governance index has no impact on dividend policy. Therefore, policy makers should focus 
on other factors while making their strategic policies to attract investors, and not focus solely on 
corporate governance.  
 
 
5.2 Limitations and Future Directions 
 
In further studies, more variables could be incorporated to investigate the impact of corporate 
governance index on dividend policy. This relationship should be generalized within different 
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